THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRACY: TO THE RESCUE OF THE SPIRIT OF THE SPIRIT by Correa, Rodrigo P
 1
THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRACY: TO THE RESCUE OF THE SPIRIT OF THE SPIRIT  
 
Rodrigo P. Correa G. 
Profesor Asociado 
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez 
rodrigo.correa@uai.cl 
 
Judges exercise public power. The ideal of democracy demands that every exercise of public 
power should express the will of the people. The popular or general will does not exist, however, 
as a brute fact, given that the people or the nation can only be conceived as a unity in normative, 
not natural terms. In other words, the people or the nation has no will because it is not a subject 
with mental states. The popular or general will must therefore be attributed normatively to a 
people or nation, itself also a normative construct. This means that, in principle, every exercise 
of public power, not only judicial power, is problematic from the point of view of democracy. 
Taken to the extreme, one might even put in doubt whether the legislative powers of our states 
live up to the ideal of democracy. This is not a merely academic question. The rising level of 
political apathy that characterises some of our political systems but does not necessarily imply a 
rejection of democracy as governmental ideal, suggests its increasing practical relevance. 
The question of the relation between public powers and democracy thus evolves into the 
question of the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the exercise of public powers 
can be attributed to the people or the nation. In other words, at issue is the concept of 
representation. Again, this is a normative question which must be answered starting from moral 
and political convictions. Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of academic professionals to submit 
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the leading moral and political convictions of our societies to rational scrutiny or even the most 
barbaric exercises of power could be justified in the name of democracy. 
Fortunately, our political institutions are not built out of thin air. They are the outcome of 
a tradition whose doctrinal foundations can be traced back to the Enlightenment and whose 
institutions have their origin in the revolutions of the end of the Eighteenth Century. This 
tradition provides some answers to the problem of representation. The French Revolution first 
established that the nation’s representatives were the legislative body and the king (Constitution 
of 1791, title III art 2). Starting from the abolition of the monarchy on September 21, 1792, the 
legistlative body becomes the only representative of the nation. To the extent that the right to 
vote and be elected was expanded, it became possible to speak of representative democracy. This 
answers the question about the attribution of legislative power to the people or nation: this is 
possible to the extent that the legislators are citizens elected for a certain period of time in public 
elections open to practically the entire adult population. The United States tradition leads to a 
similar response. But what about judicial power? 
Doctrinally, the classic answer can be found in Montesquieu. It is interesting to note that 
the doctrine holding that the power “to judge is in some sense next to nothing” consists of two 
parts.1 The first concerns judges as organs and the second relates to the judicial function. About 
the former Montesquieu wrote that,  
 
[t]he judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by 
persons taken from the body of the people at certain times of the year, and consistently 
                                                 
1 [Montesquieu, 1748 #734 @bk XI ch 6 p 72 (I substituted “power to judge” for “judiciary”, for being more faithful 
to the French ‘puissance de juger’)]. 
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with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last 
only so long as necessity requires. 
By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any 
particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the 
judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate.2 
 
This marks out a considerable difference with the other two branches of government that “may 
be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies”.3 
The other part of the doctrine is found in these famous words: “the national judges are no 
more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of 
moderating either its force or rigour”4 At stake here is not the organization of the courts, but the 
nature of their function. 
Montesquieu’s doctrine profoundly influenced the French Revolution, giving rise to the 
very peculiar institutions of the Tribunal de Cassation and the référé législative.5 The Tribunal’s 
function was to police the application of the law. It was invested with the power to strike down 
judicial decisions, but without going into the merits of the case. The impenetrability of the merits 
concerned both facts and law. In other words, when striking down a decision, the Tribunal 
simply established that the law had been manifestly wrongly applied, but without making a 
positive determination of what would have been its correct application. Due to its exclusively 
negative function, the Tribunal might be asked to examine the same case twice. Given that a 
                                                 
2 [Montesquieu, 1748 #734 @bk XI ch 6 p 70]. 
3 Ibid. 
4 [Montesquieu, 1748 #734 @bk XI ch 6 p 73]. 
5 The analysis of the Tribunal de Casación and the référé législative are based on [Geny,  #1629]. 
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decision by the Tribunal de Cassation did not resolve the legal issue in a way binding upon 
lower judges, the law might once again have been wrongly applied by the lower court. A second 
cassation, however, was sufficient proof that, rather than a ‘manifest’ misapplication of the law, 
a more profound interpretive difficulty was at stake. Resolving this interpretive difficulty was not 
the proper task of judges but befell to the legislator. In such cases, the référé legislative was the 
mechanism by which the legislative body resolved interpretive doubts concerning the judicial 
application of the law. 
The référé législative was therefore a considerable limitation of the Tribunal. As a matter 
of fact, the Tribunal was originally conceived as a kind of legislator’s police, rather than as a 
body in charge of unifying judicial decisions. This is confirmed by the constitutional mandate to 
create the tribunal auprés du Corps législatif, that is, next to the legislative body. (Constitution of 
1791 title III ch V art 19) 
It is true that the French revolutionaries did not follow Montesquieu’s suggestion to 
create temporary courts. Still, the spirit of the ideal of Montesquieu was paid some tribute to in 
two ways. First, through the vigilance of the courts by the Tribunal de Cassation as already 
described. Second, through the arrangement of juries. 
The revolutionary design of the judiciary did not survive for long. The legistative référé 
found almost no practical application. The declaration that the Tribunal de Cassation would be 
established next to the legislative body was of no practical relevance. In time, the Tribunal de 
Cassation, transformed into the Cour de Cassation, obtained a role of primary importance 
through the development of judicial legal doctrine. Notwithstanding the transitoriness of 
revolutionary excesses, the ideal of separation of powers, based on a conception of the power to 
judge as categorically different from legislation, and the conception of the judiciary as a 
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negligible power, has been constitutive for the republican ideal in many Latin American 
countries. It seems to me that in the republican constitution of Chile it has played an important 
role.6 
Times have changed however. Today it seems anachronistic to insist on the French 
Revolution’s conception of the judiciary. Various intellectual movements inspired by different, 
sometimes even contradictory, visions of the world, coincide in rejecting this conception and 
embracing a judiciary that is more committed to justice than to statutory law. The 
shortsightedness of this overlapping consensus between rightwingers and lefties, conservatives 
and liberals, does not fail to surprise. They all seem to believe that ‘justice’ will correspond to 
their conception of it, and that judges will have no problem in discerning it, even if outside and 
above the laws. This has led to a severe loss of prestige of formalism and an enthousiastic 
commitment to a jurisprudence of rights. The agreement is moreover taken advantage of by 
judges to promote their corporate interests. We have pathetically renounced the arms the 
Enlightenment provided us with to confront the judiciary’s claims to larger spheres of autonomy 
and increased freedom from statutory law. 
It would be unwise to advocate a return to revolutionary discourse without taking account 
of the reasons for its failure. Perhaps their examination will force us to conclude that the 
discourse was entirely utopical and that reviving it would be a mistake. But even in that case it 
would be possible to try to rescue the spirit behind the idea of the judicial power as “in some 
sense next to nothing”, defended by Montesquieu in the Spirit of the Laws. This is precisely my 
aim in this paper. In other words, to come to the rescue of the Enlightenment ideal of justice 
while leaving behind its institutional naivity. 
                                                 
6 Cf. [Figueroa Quiteros, 1982 #1630]. 
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I. The Judiciary 
Montesquieu’s ideal concerning the judicial function has significant consequences for the 
organization of the judiciary: judges must be independent from the other two powers. In fact, the 
idea that judges be the mouth that pronounces the words of the law ony constitutes a safeguard 
for political liberty to the extent that those same judges do not make law nor execute it. This is 
affirmed by Montesquieu himself. Judicial independence is in accord with the ideal organization 
of the judiciary as envisioned by him.7 
In continental legal systems, judges constitute a bureaucracy. The absence of juries 
strengthens the bureaucratic character of the judicial organization. At the institutional level, the 
organization of our courts is a far cry from Montesquieu’s ideal. And if in his ideal world the 
independence of judges were unproblematic, exactly the opposite occurs in bureacractic 
judiciaries. 
In Montesquieu’s scheme, judges are independent from the legislator and the executive 
for being “persons taken from the body of the people at certain times of the year, and 
consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should 
last only so long as necessity requires.” Given the actual organization of the judiciary, however, 
their independence is much more problematic. Judicial bureaucracies are permanent, not 
temporary. In fact, in a democratic republic judges hold their offices for a considerably longer 
                                                 
7 “ Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislativa and exectuvie. Were it joind 
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be 
then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and opresión.” 
[Montesquieu, 1748 #1372 @bk XI ch 6 p 70]. 
 7
period of time that members of government and parliament. This makes judicial independece 
doubly problematic. 
In the first place, bureaucratic structures typically submit their activities to bureaucratic 
controls. Ascension within the structure is closely related to those controls. Inevitably, a vigilated 
subject loses independence towards the vigilante. Controls can be external or internal. When they 
are external, there exists the risk that judges lose their independence from the other powers of the 
state. When they are internal, the subordinate loses his independence from his hierarchical 
superiors. The preservation of judicial independence requires therefore a careful look at both 
internal (internal independence) and external (external independence) controls. 
In the second place, bureaucracies tend to generate their own interests. For this reason, 
internal controls may be as threatening to independence as external controls. The existence of 
interests proper to the judical bureaucracy also corroses Montesquieu’s ideal of a power “in some 
sense next to nothing”. The judiciary, just like any other bureaucracy, will use part of its power 
to obtain the satisfaction of its own interests. 
The situation as described here would not be so serious were we clearly aware of it. The 
most troubling, however, is that we have lost our guard. We have completely forgotten the 
institutional dimension of the judiciary as a power “in some sense next to nothing.” Due to our 
forgetfulness we have lost track of the meaning and original value of judicial independence and 
stand unarmed against judicial demands for more autonomy from the other branches of 
government. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that the superior courts of justice in some 
countries, under pretence of strengthening judicial independence, try to increase their 
bureaucratic control over judges and, in many instances, weaken the intensity of their submission 
to the law. 
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Chile is a good example of this phenomenon. Upon reestablishing democracy, the 
Supreme Court disposed of many more political powers than it had at the time of the coup. It 
elected (and still elects) three senators, two of its own former Justices and a former General 
Comptroller of the Republic (Political Constitution art 45 inc 3 letters b and c). Its opinion had to 
be heard (and still has to be heard) about any bill purporting to modify judicial organization or 
powers (Political Constitution art 74 paras 2ff). Over the last years, Congress and the 
Constitutional Court have extended this norm such that the opinion of the Court must be heard 
on any minor modification of the most insignificant judicial procedure. The Supreme Court 
elected (and still elects) three out of seven members of the Constitutional Court (Political 
Constitution art 81 para 1 letter a).8 The President of the Supreme Court is ex officio member of 
the National Security Council (Political Constitution art 95 para 1).9 Additional to these 
institutions, heritage of the military government, the Supreme Court has created its own “ethical 
commission”. This commission investigates indictments of unethical behaviour by judicial 
officials, and allows the Court to apply sanctions. Even one of the Supreme Court’s own 
members was removed in this way. 
                                                 
8 There exists agreement within the Senatorial Commission on Constitution, Legislation, Justice and Rules to modify 
this arrangement. The number of members of the Constitutional Court would be increased to nine, and the three 
justices of the Supreme Court would be temporarily suspended from their functions in said Court to dedicate 
themselves exclusively to the Constitutional Court for the period of their appointment. After completion of this 
period, they would reassume their functions in the Supreme Court. Senado, Comisión de Constitución, Legislación, 
Justicia y Reglamento, Second report published on Nºs 2.526-07 and 2.534-07 (March 18, 2003). 
9 There exists agreement within the Senatorial Commission on Constitution, Legislation, Justice and Rules to modify 
the functions of the National Security Council. Ibid. However, the President of the Supreme Court would still take 
seat in this new Council. 
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There have been some reforms pointing towards the opposite direction, in particular 
concerning the Judicial Academy. The Academy has been important mainly for having 
substantially diminished the influence of judges in the selection of future members of the 
judiciary. The other instutitional reform that should be mentioned concerns the incorporation of 
Supreme Court members from outside the judicial career track. However, this has not had the 
positive impact many had hoped for. 
The institutional framework is complemented by a critical public opinion of the judiciary. 
The Supreme Court has responded to public opinion using three different strategies. First, it has 
instigated a policy of investigation and sanctioning of disciplinary misbehaviour by judges and 
judicial officials, most visibly through the creation and functioning of the Ethical Commission 
already mentioned. Second, it has created a press office. The press officer in charge has even 
published columns in the press defending Court decisions that had been subject to criticism. 
Third, the Court has developed a judicial reform agenda meant to strengthen its institutional 
independence. The agenda includes increase of financial means assigned to the judiciary, more 
autonomy for the Supreme Court to distribute these resources, absolute control over the Judicial 
Academy, more administrative autonomy to determine the creation and dismantling of courts, 
transfers and removals of judges. During the last months, the Court has given such priority to its 
agenda that its last President was forced to retire prematurely for having reached an agreement 
with the Ministry of Justice on a package of reforms that was considered insufficient by the 
majority of his colleagues. 
The current position of the judiciary within the Chilean constitutional system is quite 
uncomfortable. The Supreme Court seems to perceive this and has reacted in the ways just 
described. Should its agenda prevail, this would simply aggravate the problem. Remarkably, its 
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pronouncements in terms of increased independence has not been challenged by law professors 
nor by practising lawyers (with some exceptions, these do not actually constitute two different 
groups, the former being simply a subdivision of the latter). But this is less odd considering that 
we have forgotten Montesquieu’s original idea that the independence of judicial power should go 
hand in hand with its virtual non-existence as a branch of government. 
Can the judiciary be organized in such a way as to make the power to judge equal “next 
to nothing”? I suggest that it can, and that the way to proceed is by debilitating its corporal 
structure.10 Even if it is inviable to confer judicial power to “persons taken from the body of the 
people at certain times of the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, 
in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires”, it is possible to 
organize the judiciary in such a way as to minimize the generation of corporative interests. This, 
for sure, is easier said than done. Its success requires taking account of, at least, instutitional and 
cultural factors. From an institutional point of view, minimizing the generation of corporative 
interests could be achieved by eliminating the main bureaucratic characteristics of the judicial 
organisation, particularly the existence of a judicial career track. It cannot be ignored though that 
the elimination of the judicial career would go against a long established tradition in Latin 
American countries. Better therefore to concentrate on some critical points, like the salaries of 
trial court judges and the mechanisms for the qualification and appointment of judges. 
Bureaucratic culture may be challenged by other than institutional reforms. Perhaps more 
important even than these is the legal culture. It must be insisted that the independence of the 
                                                 
10 Similarly, Juan Enrique Vargas, “Independencia versus Control del Poder Judicial”, paper presented at the 
International Conference of Experts on Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Gorbachev Foundation for North 
America and Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (Madrid, October 2001), 
published at «www.cejamericas.org». 
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power to judge requires independent judges, not an autonomous judicial organization, and that 
the judicial organization should not constitute a branch of government equivalent to the other 
two. Such insistence would contribute to the development of a culture in which claims such as 
presently made by the Chilean Supreme Court would have to be defended more persuasively 
than by a mere appeal to the ‘independence of the judicial power’. 
Intents to reduce the bureaucratic nature of the judiciary should avoid the danger of 
transferring power from the superior courts to the trial court level. The judiciary should not be 
‘democratized’ in the sense that the power to take decisions affecting corporative interests would 
simply be displaced internally. The example of Italy would show that, where this happens, the 
judiciary does not gain but lose independence.11 Where mechanisms that control professional 
functioning become less important, less prepared judges will be allowed to ascend. Less well 
trained judges are more susceptible to pressures of all kinds. Corporativism, hierarchical or 
‘democratic’, seriously affects the power to judge. 
 
II. The judicial function  
Independence is a necessary but insufficient condition for judges to be “the mouth that 
pronounces the words of the law”. This ideal of the judicial function is based on a naive 
distinction between creating and applying the law. But acknowledging as much should not make 
us eager to renounce the ideal of Montesquieu. The law is the expression of the popular will. If 
we renounce to judges being bound by law, we also give up on the manifestation of democratic 
will through judicial decisions. We should therefore ask ourselves, how can judges be bound by 
law? 
                                                 
11 Guiseppe Di Federico, . . . 
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This question requires a much more careful and paused examination than I could possibly 
engage in here. I will only suggest a thesis that addresses part of this problem: that judges can 
only be constrained by law where there exists a vigorous differentiated legal doctrine. In very 
complex and dynamic societies like ours, with a high level of legal regulation embracing all 
spheres of social life, fidelity of judicial decisions to legislation requires a means that only 
complex argumentative traditions can provide. Because of their complexity, these argumentative 
traditions obtain considerable autonomy which translates into its own body of literature, centers 
of study and professionals. The ideal of democratic law understood as law that can be understood 
by any lay person, is an illusion. 
It is true that laws are expressed in natural language… but only up to a point. However 
rich natural language may be, it falls short of taking account of the subtle but important 
differences presented by apparently similar situations. Accumulated experience, sometimes for 
centuries, sometimes for months or years only, has distinguished these situations and labelled 
them. Thus we distinguish between possession and property, embezzlement and theft, taking and 
regulation. These respective linguistic conventions are preserved and developed by professionals 
dedicated to the study of law. Statutes make use of these conventions. Thus the legislator 
increases its range of possible actions, as it needs less time to express the content of its will with 
more accuracy. 
Moreover, given that the democratic legislator is not individual but collective, the 
technical language of the law is the meetingpoint where to constitute its will. Therefore it is only 
partly true that laws are expressed in natural language. In truth, they are expressed in a mixture 
of natural and legal-technical language. The expansion of the democratic legislator’s range of 
action necessarily results in a legislation that is not easily accesible to the lay person. The law, 
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democratic to the extent that it expresses the will of the people, cannot be democratic in the sense 
of easily understood by all. 
Legal doctrine not only expands the potential range of action for the legislator, it also 
fulfills a vital role in binding judges to the law. The will of the democratic legislator does not 
exist as a natural will. Only individual wills exist and even these are only partly accesible to their 
agents. The will of the legislator is therefore the will that may justifiably be attributed to the text 
of the law. If however the legislative language were read as an exclusively natural language, too 
many (and sometimes too few) meanings would be attributable to the text. Legal doctrine fulfills 
the task of limiting the universe of meanings that may justifiably be attributed to a legal text and 
in this way binds the judge to the legislator. 
The two functions of legal doctrine just described are complementary. On the one hand, it 
provides the democratic legislator with technical concepts required to lay down the law. On the 
other hand, it constrains the judge who attributes meaning to a legal text by recurring to the same 
conceptual framework of references. Thus it ties the power to judge to the democratic law in a 
way that would be unavailable under a superficially more democratic legal system. 
In Chile, and I have no reason to think that Chile is the exception in Latin America, the 
fidelity of judges to law has become too feable, due to a weakening of the argumentative 
tradition. I see two major causes for this debilitation. On the one hand, the level of scientific 
production is very low and stands in no relation whatsoever to the legislative needs. This should 
be unsurprising, because it simply reflects the non-existence of a scientific community. 
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The second cause is found in the jurisprudence of rights that comes hand in hand with the 
direct application of the constitution to all sorts of cases.12 Constitutional rights are considered 
limits to the legislative power. The recognition of their justiciability already implies a relaxation 
of the submission of judges to law. There are some who for this reason alone reject all judicial 
recognition of constitutional rights. But I need not take that position to argue that constitutional 
rights have weakened the fidelity of Chilean judges to law. Even accepting that the judiciability 
of fundamental rights is necessary to subject democratic will to certain limits, one would have to 
conclude that the rights jurisprudence has unnecessarily loosened the relationship between the 
judge and the law. In this respect, the second debilitating cause is confluent with the first. The 
jurisprudence of rights has produced this effect in Chile because there practically exists no 




The democratic will is an institutional fact. In modern States we take it that laws are attributable 
to the people or nation when they are the outcome of a public legislative process conducted by a 
group of representatives elected by popular vote. Even though judges are not directly elected by 
the people, we understand that their power is democratic when it is constrained by law. The 
constraint of law cannot be direct but must be mediated by relatively autonomous argumentative 
traditions. No truly democratic justice can exist if not for legal doctrine that necessarily distances 
law from the lay person. 
                                                 
12 On another occasion I referred to this phenomenon as “Vulgarization by Constitutionalization”, paper presented at 
the I Student Conference on Constitutional Law, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, August 2003. 
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The law can only bind the power to judge when judges are independent. A judge is not 
independent when vigilated by persons whose interests in controlling him are not primarily 
motivated by the supremacy of the law. The bureaucratic organization of the judiciary generates 
its own interests other than the interest of law. Hence, internal controls may affect judicial 
independence as much as external controls. 
We must come to the rescue of Montesquieu’s ideal of the power to judge as “in some 
sense, next to nothing”, which embraced both organizational and functional aspects. The naivity 
of Montesquieu’s institutional arrangement should not bring us to abandon an ideal that seems 
particularly appropriate for the judicial power in a democratic republic. 
